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By EDWARD S. MASON t
I.
THE TERM monopoly as used in the law is not a tool of analysis but
a standard of evaluation. Not all trusts are held monopolistic but only
"bad" trusts; not all restraints of trade are to be condemned but only
"unreasonable" restraints. The law of monopoly has therefore been
directed toward a development of public policy with respect to certain
business practices. This policy has required, first, a distinction between
the situations and practices which are to be approved as in the public
interest and those which are to be disapproved, second, a classification
of these situations as either competitive and consequently in the public
interest or monopolistic and, if unregulated, contrary to the public in-
terest, and, third, the devising and application of tests capable of demar-
cating the approved from the disapproved practices. But the devising of
tests to distinguish monopoly from competition cannot be completely
separated from the formulation of the concepts. It may be shown, on the
contrary, that the difficulties of formulating tests of monopoly have defi-
nitely shaped the legal conception of monopoly.
Economics, on the other hand, has not quite decided whether its task
is one of description and analysis or of evaluation and prescription, or
both. With respect to the monopoly problem it is not altogether clear
whether the work of economists should be oriented toward the formu-
lation of public policy or toward the analysis of market situations. The
trend, however, is definitely towards the latter. The further economics
goes in this direction, the greater becomes the difference between legal
and economic conceptions of the monopoly problem. Lawyers and econ-
omists are therefore rapidly ceasing to talk the same language.
Twenty years ago this was not the case. In 1915 there appeared in
the JOURNAL an article on the Trust Problem which quoted the opinions
of eminent economists on the significance of a contemporary "trust"
decision.' The point the author was trying to make, flattering indeed to
the study of economics, was "that in cases of this character no decision
can be legally sound that is not fundamentally correct from an economic
point of view." 2 The question posed to the economists was the import in
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1. Friedman, The Trust Problem in the Light of Some Recent Decisions (1915)
24 Y.aE L. J. 488.
2. Id. at 493.
MONOPOLY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
terms of monopoly of the production by the International Harvester
Company of 65-85%o of the national output of certain types of harvest-
ing machinery.3 While the answers may or may not have been helpful
in the formulation of legal opinion, it is a point of peculiar interest that
the economists conceived the problem in much the same way as the courts.
It was not monopoly as an analytical concept but monopoly injurious
to the public interest which colored their thinking. The economists' em-
phasis on free entry into the industry as characteristic of competition
and restriction of entry as the differentia spccifica of monopoly was in
complete harmony with the judicial predilection. Monopoly was thought
of as the antithesis of free competition, unregulated monopoly was always
and necessarily a public evil, the nature of monopoly was to be found
mainly in restrictions on trade, and its remedy was, in the Wilsonian
phrase, "a fair field with no favor."
Since that time, particularly in recent years, economic thinking on the
subject of monopoly has taken a radically different trend. Much more
attention has been given to the shaping of the concept of monopoly as
a tool of economic analysis rather than as a standard of evaluation in
the judgment of public policy. Some of the consequences of this trend
have been the focussing of attention on the problems of the individual
firm rather than those of the industry, a recognition of monopoly ele-
ments in the practices of almost every firm, a recognition of the impos-
sibility of using the fact of monopoly as a test of public policy, and a
growing awareness of the necessity of making distinctions between mar-
ket situations all of which have monopoly elements. The trend has led
to a split between the approach to the monopoly problem in the law
and economics which requires bridging by interpretative work of a high
order. The following pages are not concerned primarily with this task
but rather with an economist's impression of the divergence between
the present legal and economic concepts of monopoly.
II.
The elements out of which both law and economics have built their
ideas of monopoly are restriction of trade and control of the market.
These elements are of course not independent. Restrictions of trade of
various sorts are familiar devices for securing control of the market;
control of the market may be used, as in predatory competition, to restrict
trade and competition. Nevertheless, restraints of trade can exist with-
out anything that the courts would be willing to call control of the mar-
ket. And, control of the market, in the economic sense, can exist inde-
pendently of any practice which the law would call a restraint of trade.
3. Id. at 502,503.
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It is also important at this point to understand the content of several
other basic concepts. The antithesis of the legal conception of monopoly
is free competition, understood to be a situation in which the freedom
of any individual or firm to engage in legitimate economic activity is
not restrained by the state, by agreements between competitors or by
the predatory practices of a rival. But free competition thus under-
stood is quite compatible with the presence of monopoly elements in
the economic sense of the word monopoly. For the antithesis of the
economic conception of monopoly is not free but pure competition,
understood to be a situation in which no seller or buyer has any control
over the price of his product. Restriction of competition is the legal
content of monopoly; control of the market is its economic substance.
And these realities are by no means equivalent.
An illustration of the application of these concepts is presented by
the facts of the Cream of Wheat case.4 The Cream of Wheat Company
bought purified middlings, a high-grade by-product of wheat, and, "with-
out submitting them to any process or treatment, without adding any-
thing to them, it puts up the middlings which it selects in packages and
offers its selection to the trade under the name of 'Cream of Wheat'.""
The court was unable to see either control of the market or restriction
of trade in this practice. "The business of the defendant is not a
monopoly, or even a quasi-monopoly. Really it is selling purified wheat
middlings and its whole business covers only about 1 per cent. of that
product. It makes its own selection of what by-products of the middling
process it will put up, and sells what it puts up under marks which tell
the purchaser that these middlings are its own .selection. It is open to
Brown, Jones and Robinson to make their selections out of the other
99% of purified middlings and put them up and sell them; possibly one
or more of them may prove to be better selectors than the defendant, or
may persuade the public that they are."'
An economist, on the other hand, would be inclined to say that the
product sold is not wheat middlings but Cream of Wheat, and that the
Cream of Wheat Company exercises some monopolistic control of the
market unless, and this is unlikely, the number and quantity of substi-
tute products is such as to render the price independent of the quantity
sold. He would add that it does not follow that the market control
incident to such a monopoly position is contrary to public policy. Fur-
thermore he would consider monopoly of the production of Cream of
Wheat as perfectly compatible with competition on the part of actual
or potential producers of substitute products.
4. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. Cream of Wheat Company, 227
Fed. 46 (1915).
5. Id. at 47.
6. Id. at 48.
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The economists' emphasis is on control of the supply or price of a
product. And "product" is defined in terms of consumer choice, for if
consumers find that the goods sold by two competing dealers are differ-
ent, they are different for purposes of market analysis regardless of
what the scales or calipers say. Some control of the market exists when-
ever a seller can, by increasing or diminishing his sales, affect the price
at which his product is sold. Since, outside the sphere of agricultural
and a few other products, almost every seller is in this position, it is
easy to see that if monopoly is identified with control of the market,
monopolistic elements are practically omnipresent. This is the logical
conclusion, it is submitted, where the emphasis is laid upon control of
the market and the monopoly concept is considered as a tool of analysis
only, unrelated to public policy. But if monopoly is considered to be
a standard of evaluation useful in the administration of public policy
then other considerations must be involved.
It is so used in the law. Although the history of the term's legal
usage is filled with references to control of the market as evidence of
monopoly, various factors, principally the difficulties of devising tests
of the reasonableness of price and output controls, have focussed the
attention of courts on another element, restriction of trade, as the de-
cisive consideration. The development of this idea may be seen in the
sources of the present law of monopoly and competition, which are, ac-
cording to Jervey and Defik, to be found in "(A) the Statute against
Monopolies and D'Arcy v. Allein; (B) the old English statutes against
forestalling and engrossing; (C) the judicial adaptation of the ancient law
on restraint of trade to the combination acting as a unit of controlled
parts; and (D) the law of conspiracy as applied to the illegal end of
suppression of competition, with particular reference to labor conspira-
cies insofar as they were seen as restraints on the market."7
It is clear from the Statute of Monopolies' and from contemporary
definitions that monopoly meant exclusion of other producers or sellers
by a dispensation from the sovereign granting sole rights to some person
or persons.9 Although D'Arcy v. Allein declared the "inseparable inci-
dents" of monopoly to be (1) the raising of the price of the product,
(2) the deterioration of its quality, and (3) the "impoverishment of
7. HUGER W. JERVFY AND FRANCIS DEAK, ThE CASE or M,onomLY v. Cowz-
IrIo=N, (Mimeo., 1934).
8. 21 Jac. I, c. 3. (1623).
9. Coke defined monopoly in this way: "An institution, or allowance by the king,
by his grant, commission, or otherwise, to any person or persons, bodies poitique or
corporate, of, or for the sole buying, selling, maldng, working, or using, of anything,
whereby any person, or persons, bodies politique or corporate, are sought to be restrained
of any freedom or liberty that they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade."
3 INsTrrumS No. 181.
10. 11 Co. 84b, 74 Eng. Reprint 1131 (1602).
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divers artificers and others" because of exclusion from their accustomed
trades, a monopoly was considered to exist whether or not these "inci-
dents" followed. It was not incumbent upon the courts to show that
prices had actually been raised or quality of the product deteriorated in
order to be able to hold that a monopoly existed contrary to the common
law.11 Monopoly meant exclusion from a certain trade by legal dispensa-
tion and no examination of control of the market was necessary to estab-
lish this fact.
The injuries inflicted by forestalling, regrating and engrossing were
in the main conditioned and limited by an early and now obsolete system
of distributing and marketing goods, principally foodstuffs. Laws were
found necessary to prohibit the spreading of false reports as to the state
of the market (regrating), to prohibit the purchase of victuals on the
way to market for purposes of resale (forestalling), and to prohibit the
cornering of the available supply of an article (engrossing).12 It is true
that engrossing in particular was an act undertaken to secure what an
economist would call control of the market. But in the absence of a
combination, of attempts to exclude competitors, or of other overt acts,
it was difficult for the courts to find evidence of control of the market.
There is no obvious answer to the question of how large a share of the
available supply of an article an individual must purchase before he is
guilty of engrossing. If, on the other hand, the engrossing were accom-
plished by a combination, particularly if the combination attempted to
exclude competitors, the problem appeared to be more simple. 3 Con-
spiracy frequently accompanied engrossing in the early cases and was
rarely absent in the later ones. In no engrossing case that has come before
Anglo-Saxon courts in the last hundred and fifty years, so far as I
am aware, has a court undertaken to discover the existence of engrossing
by examining the control of the engrosser over the price. What cases
there are, and they have been few, have been complicated by the presence
11. As a matter of fact it is quite possible that a monopoly dispensation would not
give'to its holder control of the market in the sense of ability to raise price or to
lower the quality of the product. Whether it did or not would depend, in economic
jargon, on the elasticity of demand for that product, and this in turn would be influenced
by a number of factors including the existence of effective substitutes.
12. See Jones, Historical Developnent of The Law of Business Competition (1926)
35 YALE L. J. 905, at 907 et seq.
13. "To gain a monopoly on a local market a common, organized action, in other
words a cartel of the most powerful competitors, often became a necessity. The fact
that competitors acted in agreement when engrossing the market is expressed in the
English anti-monopolistic legislation by the significant term conspiracy. This word was
first used in this connection in the Statute of 1353 [a Forestalling Statute, of 27 Edw.
III], and reappears continually in the anti-monopolistic statutes. From here it passes
over to the American anti-trust legislation, being thus a continuation of the old monopoly
prohibitions." PIcrROWSKI, CAuTE.s AND TRUSTS (1933) 148, quoted in JERVEY AND
DEAx, op. cit. supra, note 7.
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of combinations or conspiracies to restrain trade. The courts have found
monopoly because of conspiracy and the exclusion of others from the
market rather than control of the market. It is doubtful whether the
act of engrossing itself, in the absence of a conspiracy to exclude com-
petitors, would carry any monopoly connotation in the law. Consequently
it seems doubtful whether the ancient law respecting engrossing, fore-
stalling and regrating has made much of a contribution to present legal
concepts of monopoly.
In a somewhat different status in this respect is the law on restraint
of trade. The question of restraints originally came before the courts
in cases involving the sale of a business in which, as an incident to the
sale, the seller contracted not to compete with the buyer. Until some-
time in the 17th century the courts uniformly held such contracts unen-
forceable, the basis of the rule being "that public policy demands from
every man the free exercise of his trade in the public interest."14 Did
public policy demand the free exercise of trade because in the absence
of such free exercise there would be a control of the market?
Restrictive covenants, if enforceable, certainly may lead to control of
a local market, but control of the market is not dependent on the exist-
ence of such contracts. Doctors, lawyers, or tradesmen dealing in a
particular type of article may be, and frequently were in the period in
which restrictive covenants were unenforceable, the sole practitioners
of their profession or trade in a given locality possessing a control of
the local market. Yet this fact does not appear to have led to legislative
or judicial concern. It appears more consistent with the early decisions
to say that restrictive covenants were feared because one who contracted
himself out of a livelihood might become a public charge.
The development in the 17th and 18th century of the doctrine of
"reasonable restraints," as applied to restrictive covenants in connection
with the sale of a business, does not seem to have involved any closer
consideration of the monopoly problem. Although it is sometimes said,15
or implied, that the reasonableness which concerned the courts in such
contracts was understood not only in relation to the interests of the
contracting parties but also to the public interest in prevention of control
of the market, it is difficult to substantiate this view by an appeal to the
decisions.16 The application of the doctrine of reasonableness to the
interests of the contracting parties is clear. The interest of the buyer
was a property interest, that the value of the purchased business not be
lessened by competition from the seller in the immediate vicinity, while
that of the seller was not only a property interest, since he obtained
14. Cooke, Legal Rule and Economic Function (1936) 46 Eco.n. J. 21.
15. See, e.g., Pope, The Legal Aspects of Monopoly (1907) 20 HAnv. L Rs.
167; Cooke, op. cit. stpra, note 14.
16. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Vms. 181 (1711).
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through the sale the full value of the "good will" of the business, but
also an interest in safeguarding the possibility of continuing somewhere
and at some time his trade or profession. The language of the courts
indicates that the public interest was considered affected when the public
was deprived by such a contract of a source of supply without justifica-
tion, i. e., when such a deprivation was unnecessary to the protection of
the private interests involved in the contract. This protection of the
public interest was levelled primarily not against monopolistic control
of the market but against the loss to the common weal of the services
of a productive agent. There is no evidence that the courts examined the
data relevant to the question whether such a contract might lead to con-
trol of the market. If any monopoly consideration was involved, it was
monopoly in the sense of restriction of competition, not of control of
the market.
If the test of reasonableness referred to the extent of competition
or control of the market which would result from the restrictive
contract, might we not have expected the courts to compare the market
situation in the locality affected by the contract with the market situa-
tions in other localities ? If the restrictive covenant reduced the number
of possible competitors by one, this might have a very different effect
on control of the market in a locality in which competitors were many
from its effect in a locality in which only one remained. There is not
much evidence, however, that the courts considered the easily available
facts relative to extent of market control, and the cause seems to be that
the "reasonableness" with which they were concerned in cases involving
restrictive covenants was rarely, if ever, related to the monopoly problem.
The gradual relaxation of the law on restrictive covenants is easily
understood with reference to the interests of the contracting parties and
requires no examination of the changes in the scope of market control.
With the increase in economic opportunities incident to increasing division
of labor the means of gaining a livelihood open to a seller of a business
expanded, and the restrictions imposed on his activities by these cove-
nants became less serious. On the other hand, with the growth of trans-
portation facilities the area within which the competition of the seller
might lessen the value of what he has sold had increased. For both
these reasons the scope permitted restraints of trade of this sort has
been enlarged." Moreover, whether or not the establishment of a com-
peting enterprise in a given locality was likely to affect the value of
the business sold, and whether or not a limitation in trading in a given
locality was likely to deprive a man of the means of earning his liveli-
hood and the public of the fruit of his activity were questions to which
common experience might be said to provide a tolerably satisfactory
17. Handler, Restraint of Trade, (1934) 13 ENcyc. Soc. ScimNcss 339.
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answer. The question whether the elimination of one unit of competi-
tion would result in control of the market, however, could hardly be
answered without an examination of the number of competitors left in
the restricted area and of the behavior of prices. To such an examina-
tion the courts were hesitant to proceed.
The application of the rule of reason to contracts between competitors
designed solely to limit competition among themselves stands on different
ground. It is frequently said that, as distinguished from restrictive
covenahts connected with the sale of a business, the interests of the con-
tracting parties are here not at issue since such contracts will not be
entered into unless there is prospect of gain to all from the limitation."8
While this may or may not be true, if the rule of reason is to be applied
to such cases, it must be applied on different grounds, or it must be a
different rule than that used in the older cases of restraint of trade. For
in this type of contract the public interest in the monopoly problem is
paramount, and the question of the private interests of the individual
contractors is only secondary.
The disposition of American courts has been, at least until very re-
cently, to hold all contracts for division of territory, pooling, fixing of
prices, common marketing control of supply, or which restrict the free-
dom of the contractors to compete in other ways, unenforceable and,
since the Sherman Act, illegal. The opinions of the court in these cases
constantly refer to monopoly in the sense of control of the market, but
little examination of evidence pertinent to the question of market control
is ever undertaken. The test of monopoly, or attempt of monopoly, is
here restriction of competition. American courts have in this class of
cases been willing to accept the contract itself as evidence of restriction
and, consequently, of an attempt to monopolize, without inquiring further
into the question of how great a control of the market is secured to
the contracting parties. 9 The rule of reason enunciated with much fan-
fare by Chief Justice White purporting to provide a standard of judg-
ment dividing those contractual restrictions which are in the public in-
terest from those which are not has had, at least until the Appalachian
18. Pope, op. cit. mipra, note 15; Cooke, op. cit. .ipra, note 14.
19. In another class of cases, however, dealing principally with trade association
activities, the Courts have drawn a distinction between limitation of competition and a
regulation by business agreement of competitive methods. Nowhere is this distinction
better expressed than by Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago
et al. v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, at p. 239. 'Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of the very essence. The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely. regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition."
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Coal case" in 1933, a much narrower application than might have been
expected.
The British courts, confronted with the same problem of applying
a rule of reason to contracts between competitors designed to limit com-
petition, have returned a somewhat different answer. They have tended
to accept every contract designed to limit competition among the con-
tracting competitors as reasonable in the absence of intention or actual
attempt to injure or destroy a competitor.2 On the other hand, the trend
of American opinion has been to regard all such contracts as unreason-
able restraints of trade. In neither case has the rule of reason been
given any intelligible content in terms of control of the market despite
the frequency with which this phrase has graced judicial utterances.
Cases involving a union between competitors accomplished by amal-
gamation or fusion or merger have in this country most frequently
involved the application of the rule of reason, and it is in these cases
that the characteristic legal conception of monopoly is most evident. An
amalgamation of competing firms may, and ordinarily does, take place
for reasons other than to secure control of the price of the articles pro-
duced or sold by these firms. The courts could not, therefore, plausibly
assume, as they did in the case of contracts to limit competition, that
all amalgamations were prima facie evidence of an attempt to monopolize.
Since under the Sherman Act both the contract and the combination
as an attempt to monopolize or restrain trade were illegal, some way
had to be found of making the law on combinations equivalent to the
law on contracts limiting competition. If monopoly had meant to the
courts control of the market, some such equivalence might well have
been found, although the problem would have been, and is, difficult. Yet
the sources of evidence of control of the market are known: the be-
havior of prices and outputs, the relation of prices and costs, profits
before and after the combination, share of the market controlled, the
existence of business practices such as price discrimination, price stabi-
lization and many others. The evidences of a control of the market
20. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933).
21. See the dictum of Lord Parker in the Adelaide case: " . . . it is clear that
the onus of showing that any contract is calculated to produce a monopoly or enhance
prices to an unreasonable extent will be on the party alleging it, and that if once the
court is satisfied that the restraint is reasonable as between the parties the onus will
be no light one." Attorney-General of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co., 1913 A. C.
781, 796. Such a contract may produce an "unreasonable" control of the market but
the British courts have rarely found one. A contract which restricts competition by
the destruction of a competitor's market is a different matter. Here there is an overt
act, an obvious restraint of trade, partaking of the nature of conspiracy, that does not
compel the courts to examine the behavior of prices and outputs which are the most
obvious sources of information concerning control of the market.
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established by combination would be found in the same sort of data
as in control established by contract, and a rule of reason which set up
as its standard control of the market would have yielded approximately
the same results in both types of cases.
By monopoly, however, the courts did not mean control of the mar-
ket but restriction of competition. While a contract between competitors
designed to limit competition carries the evidence on its face of an attempt
to monopolize, a merger between competitors does not, so that the courts
had perforce to enquire, (1) into the intentions of the merging inter-
ests, and (2) into such acts of the merger as might indicate restriction
of outside competition. If the intention behind a merger were control
of the market it is unlikely that it would be communicated to the courts,
and since the only evidences capable of indicating intention to control
the market were ignored we may conclude that the courts found the
presence of monopoly in other ways. If the manifestation of the inten-
tion to limit the competition of outsiders took the form of overt acts
such as local price discrimination, espionage, or securing of railway
rebates, the courts could find evidence of restrictions directly relevant
to their conception of monopoly. As a matter of fact it is clear that this
was the direction taken in the judicial application of the rule of reason.
The size of the combination or its share of the total output of a product
became important only when accompanied by predatory practices affecting
the freedom of others to compete. In the words of one commentator
it had become clear by 1918 "that the Sherman Act had evolved from
an anti-trust act into an act relating to the legal control of competitive
methods." 2  Since monopoly meant restriction of competition rather
than control of the market, this evolution was only logical.
The decision in the Standard Oil-Vacuum merger in 1931, it is true,
gave somewhat more consideration to the problem of market control
than has been usual in merger cases.' The court took into account (1)
the merged concerns' share of sales of their various products in the
local market, (2) the state of intercompany competition in the New
England market, the number and size of companies, the area of their
operations, and recent changes in the market position of the various
companies, and (3) potential competition. Despite the advance, the dicta
of Judge Kimbrough Stone in this case cannot be said to indicate a clear
conception of monopoly in terms of market control. "Competition," he
declares,
"is the antithesis of monopoly. In a sense, any elimination of com-
petition is a movement in the general direction of monopoly. But
22. McLaughlin, Legal Control of Competitive Methods (1936) 21 IOWA L REV. 28D.
23. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 47 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
For another realistic analysis of a market situation, see International Shoe Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 29 F. (2d) 518 (C. C.A. 2d, 1931).
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competition is, in its very essence, a contest for trade, and any
progress or victory in such contest must lessen competition..
It is only when this lessening is with an unlawful purpose, or by
unlawful means, or when it proceeds to the point where it is or is
threatening to become a menace to the public, that it is declared un-
lawful. . . The point of danger is reached when monopoly is
threatened."
We might now expect some indication of tests which the court will
apply to determine when monopoly is threatened. But the opinion con-
tinues, "This threat of monopoly exists, irrespective of intent, whenever
competition is lessened to the danger point." In other words monopoly
is threatened when "competition is lessened to the danger point." Com-
petition is lessened to the danger point when "monopoly is threatened."'24
Judge Stone in subsequent remarks appears to be able to get no farther
forward with tiis idea and finally falls back on a dictum of Justice
Holmes that "a combination in unreasonable restraint of trade imports
an attempt to override normal market conditions." 2 Since nothing is
more "normal" than monopolistic market conditions, this too does not
get us very far.
This summary review of the law of monopoly must lead to the con-
clusion that whatever are considered to be the evils resulting from
monopoly-enhancement of price, deterioration of product, or the like-
a monopolistic situation, or an attempt to monopolize, is evidenced to the
courts primarily, if not exclusively, by a limitation of the freedom to
compete. The original meaning of monopoly, an exclusion of others
from the market by a sovereign dispensation in favor of one seller, has
continued to mean exclusion, in the broad sense of restriction of compe-
tition. Although "undue" or "unreasonable" control of the market is
constantly inserted in judicial decisions as the meaning of monopoly,
the data capable of indicating this control are almost universally ignored
by the courts. In this country there has been a growing tendency in the
law to declare every contract between competitors which restricts com-
petition unenforceable and, since the Sherman Act, illegal, whatever the
extent of the control made possible by the contract.2" In the case of
24. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 47 F. (2d) 288, at 297 (C. C. A. 2d,
1931).
25. American Column Co., v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921).
26. There is no evidence that the courts in interpreting the Shernan Act and
later anti-trust legislation in the light of common law concepts of monopoly and
restraint of trade were violating legislative intention or substituting their under-
standing of the monopoly problem for that of the Congress. On the contrary there is.
every reason to believe that the principal acts which the Sherman Act sought to
prevent were the predatory practices of combinations which in many cases already
enjoyed a commanding control of the market. The particular practices which received"
special legislative attention were railway rebating, local price-discrimination and price
(Vol. 47: 34
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mergers the monopoly or attempt to monopolize is discovered primarily
in predatory practices designed to hamper the competition of outsiders
and not in control of the market.
III.
It has been noted above that the elements on which the idea of monopoly
has been built both in law and in economics have been control of the
market and restriction of competition. If in their development of the
law of monopoly the courts have tended to give mere lip service to the
former and to identify monopoly with restriction of competition, the
principal reasons are probably the following:
(1) The courts have been faced with the necessity of devising and
applying to particular situations a standard of evaluation relevant to
a vague concept known as the public interest. The injury to numerous
private interests, and consequently to the public interest, from predatory
attacks on established business enterprises, or from other attempts to
restrict competition, was much more direct than that which might pos-
sibly be inflicted on buyers or sellers by a control of the market exer-
cised independently of any attempts to restrict competition.
(2) The formulation of a standard of monopoly or monopolizing
contrary to the public interest required the selection of tests capable of
distinguishing competitive from monopoly situations. If monopoly were
conceived as control of the market, the tests must necessarily be related
to the behavior of prices, outputs and other variables indicative of con-
trol, an exceedingly difficult problem. If, on the other hand, monopoly
is identified with restriction of competition, the devising of tests is com-
paratively simple.
(3) There is reason to believe that in an earlier period control of
the market was much more dependent upon restriction of entry and
other types of restriction of competition through predatory practices and
harassing tactics than at present. The law of monopoly, though directed
against restrictions of competition, may once have had more relevance
to control of the market than it at present possesses.
(4) Before the Sherman Act monopoly actions were brought, with
but few exceptions, before the courts on the suit of private interests.
These interests were more likely to be directly affected adversely by
maintenance. The sponsors of the Act announced on many occasions that it was not
designed to prevent combinations either of labor or capital, and in answer to the
specific question whether an enterprise would be considered a monopoly if, because of
superior skill, it alone received all the orders for a particular article, Senator Hoar
replied, "The word 'monopoly' is a merely technical term which has a clear and legal
significance, and it is this: it is the sole engrossing to a man's self by Reans which
prevent other men froin engaging in fair comnpetition t h hitm." 21 CoiG. RPc. 3152
(1890).
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predatory practices or attempts at exclusion from the market than by
control of prices.
Although these considerations may help to explain the almost com-
plete preoccupation of the courts with restrictions on freedom of
competition, it must be recognized that our modem law embraces an
antiquated and inadequate conception of the monopoly problem. Atten-
tion and criticism has therefore centered around the following aspects
of our public policy with respect to monopoly and competition: the
tendency of the courts to find illegal every contract limiting competi-
tion among the contracting competitors regardless of the effect or prob-
able effect of such a contract on control of the market; the tendency
to judge the legality of a combination or merger primarily on the basis
of its competitive practices without examination of the extent of its
control of the market; the absence of a developed public policy with
respect to unfair practices, in particular the unwillingness of the courts
to extend the concept of unfair competition beyond injury to a com-
petitor and to take account of the nature of the injury to the public.
The weakness of our public policy is not the result of judicial inter-
pretation but of the inadequacy of legislation. It can only be corrected
by legislation which will re-define the monopoly and trade practice
problem and provide tests by means of which market situations and
business practices considered to be favorable to the public interest can
be separated from those that are not. Since Congress has wrestled with
this problem, off and on, for fifty years without conspicuous success,
it does not appear likely that a ready-made solution can be found close
at hand. Certainly economics has none to provide. Nevertheless, the
economic approach, which is in some ways very different from the legal,
can be utilized in the shaping of a more satisfactory public policy.
For its own purposes economics has found control of the market a
much more useful approach to the concept of monopoly than restric-
tion of competition. Some control of the market may be said to exist
whenever the share of the sales or purchases made by any one seller or
purchaser (or group of sellers or purchasers acting by means of an
agreement) is sufficiently large to influence the price of the article sold.
In a market from which control is completely absent every seller and
buyer, acting independently, could increase or decrease his purchases or
sales without appreciable effect on the price. Such markets, which may
be said to be purely competitive in the sense of being completely devoid
of any element of control over price, are comparatively rare. In most
markets some sellers or buyers (or both) exercise some degree of con-
trol. Of course such control is perfectly compatible with the existence
of some degree of competition. A seller with complete control of the
market would be able to determine his price without regard for the
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actions of other sellers or the prices of other products; in other words,
he would have no competition. No seller or buyer has such control. All
markets, practically speaking, exhibit a fusion of monopoly and com-
petitive elements.
It follows that, if monopoly is identified with control of the market,
(a) it is impossible to separate markets into those that are competitive
and those that are monopolistic; (b) a public policy which attempted
to eliminate all positions of monopoly would confront a problem of
impossible scope and complexity. It is, furthermore, by no means clear
that the preservation of all the competitive elements and the suppression
of all the monopolistic elements would be in the public interest, however
conceived. Consequently, the existence of some control of the market
is not likely to be in itself a good indication of the necessity or wisdom
of applying preventative measures.
Having identified monopoly with control of the market, economics
has proceeded further to an examination of certain typical monopoly
situations. But the most that can be said of the results of monopoly
investigations in economics is that they cast doubts on a number of tra-
ditional legal attitudes on the question of monopoly and restraint of trade,
and that they emphasize a number of relevant considerations usually
neglected by the interpreters of public policy. The significance of the
existence of a relatively small number of buyers or sellers is a case in
point. If the number of sellers (or buyers) is small enough to induce
each seller, before changing his own selling policy, to take account of
the probable effect of this change upon the policies of his rivals, the
results of joint action by agreement, which might well be illegal, may
be accomplished without collusion of any sort. It is quite obvious from
the behaviour of cigarette prices that the manufacturers of cigarettes are
in something like this situation. No one can change his prices without
an overwhelming probability that his rivals will immediately follow
suit, and one result is that price changes are very infrequent. To pro-
duce many of the consequences of joint action no one seller has to have
a preponderant share of the total output; if the number of sellers is
relatively small, their individual share of the total output is of secondary
importance.
Nor is control of the market to be inferred merely from the number
of existing competitors. Potential competition must be considered. In-
deed the dicta of many trust cases might be interpreted as indicating a
judicial opinion that in the absence of legal restraints or of overt
predatory acts against potential competitors, free entry to the market
precludes any element of control. Free entry in this legal sense, how-
ever, is compatible under certain circumstances with a considerable degree
of market control. The capital resources necessary to establish a new
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firm in an effective competitive position may be so large as to eliminate
potential competition as a practical consideration. The fact that no new
motor car company has been established in the last decade or that no
new brand of cigarettes has been able since the war to capture a sizeable
share of the market cannot be taken to indicate that no control of the
market exists.
The legal significance attached to trade marks and trade names pro-
vides another example of the divergence between legal and economic
conceptions of monopoly. Economics, primarily concerned with the fact
of market control, has emphasized the control of price made possible
by the exploitation of a mark or name. Extensive advertising expendi-
tures may successfully differentiate in the minds of buyers the product
of a given seller from those of his rivals. The more successful this
differentiation the greater the control of the market it is possible for the
seller to achieve, and, consequently, the more entrenched his monopoly
position. But since there is no restriction of competition in the legal
sense, the law, primarily concerned in trade mark and trade name cases
with protection of intangible property interests, can see no element of
monopoly. On the other hand, economic opinion does not proceed from
the fact that there is a monopolistic significance in the use of a mark or
name to the conclusion that this institution or practice is necessarily con-
trary to the public interest 27
It is fully consistent with the legal conception of the monopoly problem
that the courts should enquire into the actual or probable results of agree-
ments to restrain competition. But to do so would be to give up the
traditional tests of monopolizing and to grapple with the problem of
what is an unreasonable control of the market. The Appalachian Coals
case 28 may indicate a tentative first step in this direction and somewhere
between this and the Sugar Institute cases" is to be found the indistinct
dividing line between certain types of restrictions which are and are
not at present considered to be in the public interest. The ways in which
competition may be restrained or "regulated," however, are many, and
if the courts are now willing to delve into the problems of market con-
trol they will have to rely more and more on economic analysis of the
different types of control situations. The significance of market con-
27. See Handler, Unfair Competition (1936) 21 IOWA L. Rxv. 175, 185. For the
views of an economist on these matters, see CHAMBERLIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
(1933) Appendix E.
28. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933).
29. United States v. Sugar Institute, 297 U. S. 553 (1936), aff'g., 15 F. Supp. 817
(S. D. N. Y. 1934). For a thorough discussion of the problems, both legal and econ-
omic, raised by these .cases, see Fly, Observations on the Anti-Trust Laws, Economic
Theory and the Sugar Institute Decisions (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1339, 46 id. 228.
[Vol. 47: 34
MONOPOLY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
trols established through various kinds of open price quoting, basing-
point and zone price systems, agreements as to price terms and the like,
are not apparent without a study of data hitherto considered by the
courts to be irrelevant to the monopoly problem.
On the other hand,. if economics is to be put itself in a position to
contribute to the formulation of public policy, it must conceive the
monopoly problem in a more extensive way than is at present customary.
It is not enough to find evidence of the existence of market controls,
nor is it sufficient to conduct purely analytical and descriptive studies of
various types of control situations. While this is important, the formu-
lation of public policy requires a distinction between situations and prac-
tices which are in the public interest and those that are not. And this
requirement imposes the necessity of elaborating tests which can be
applied by administrative bodies and by the courts. It is easy enough
to present evidence of monopoly situations, which, to economics, is merely
the absence of pure competition. The existence of price discrimination,
of price rigidity, advertising expenditures, price leadership and ofher
practices are sufficient to indicate the presence of monopoly elements.
But these practices are hardly sufficient evidence of the presence or pos-
sibility of market controls adverse to the public interest. A further
study of different types of industrial markets and business practices and
of their effects on prices, outputs, investment and employment designed
to indicate means of distinguishing between socially desirable and un-
desirable situations and practices may or may not be fruitful. It is, in
any case, the only way in which economics can contribute directly to
the shaping of public policy. A simultaneous movement by legal and
economic thinking away from entrenched positions might be conducive
to progress on this front.
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